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TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS IN FAVOR
OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE AND THE
LEGITIME OF DESCENDANTS
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
The surviving spouse in Louisiana is afforded a substantial
measure of fifiancial security by the community property system,1
the legal usufruct under article 916 of the Civil Code of 1870,2
and by the inheritance rights under articles 915 and 924 of the
same Code.3 In addition, a widow in necessitous circumstances
may claim under article 3252 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870
a privilege up to the amount of one thousand dollars from the
succession of her husband;4 and the survivor in necessitous
circumstances, widow or widower, may claim under article 2382,
under certain conditions, the so-called marital portion from the
deceased's estate.5
Quite apart from the protection accorded to the surviving
spouse directly by the law, a spouse may, in the exercise of his
or her testamentary freedom,6 provide for the survivor by will.
But when a spouse has legitimate descendants who are not
unworthy heirs, the spouse's testamentary freedom is limited
by provisions safeguarding the legitime of the descendants.7
1. Upon the death of either spouse the community of acquets and gains
terminates and the survivor is entitled to an undivided one-half of the com-
munity in perfect ownership. See LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2406 (1870); Comment,
25 LA. L. REV. 241 (1964).
2. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 916 (1870); Yiannopoulos, Legal Usufructs; Lou-
isiana and Comparative Law, 14 LOYOLA L. J. 1 (1968); Oppenheim, The Usu-fruct of the Surviving Spouse, 18 TuL L. REV. 181 (1943); Comment, 25 LA.
L. REV. 873 (1965).
3. See IA. CIvIL CODE arts. 915, 924 (1870).
4. Id. art. 3252; cf. Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34
TUL. L. REV. 3, 43-44 (1959); Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 259 (1964).
5. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2382 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1926, No. 113;
cf. Comment, 25 LA. L REV. 259 (1964); Comment, 18 TUL. L. REV. 290 (1943);
Comment, 2 LOYOLA L. J. 58 (1943); McMahon, The Original Case of the Mis-
understood Wife, 11 LOYOLA L. J. 109 (1930).
6. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 484, 491, 1470 (1870).
7. Id. arts. 1493, 1499, 1710. See also Oppenheim, One Hundred Fifty Years
of Succession Law, 33 TUL. L. REV. 43 (1958); Lemann, Some Aspects of
Simulation in France and Louisiana, 29 TUL. L. REV. 22, 47-59 (1954); Wisdom
& Pigman, Testamentary Dispositions in Louisiana Estate Planning, 26 TUL.
L. REV. 119 (1952); Dainow, The Early Sources of Forced Heirship; Its His-
tory in Texas and Louisiana, 4 LA. L. REV. 42 (1941); Lazarus, Disposable
Portion and the Legitime, 1 LOYOLA L. J. 69 (1941); Comment, 37 TUL. L. REV.
710 (1963); Comment, Collation in Louisiana, 26 TUL. L. REV. 203 (1952).
For the legitime of forced heirs in the light of trust law, see La. R.S.
9:1845 (1965); Oppenheim, The Legitime in Trust, 42 TUL. L. REv. 239 (1968);
Pascal, Some ABC's about Trusts and Us, 13 LA. L. REV. 555, 566 (1953); The
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The purpose of this article is to investigate the extent of
testamentary freedom allowed by the law to a spouse leaving
legitimate descendants and to ascertain the maximum benefits
that may be conferred on the surviving spouse by will. Since
the validity and effect of dispositions in favor of the surviving
spouse may vary with the qualities of the testator's descen-
dants as issues of the last or of a former marriage, the follow-
ing discussion is divided into two parts. The first part deals
with situations in which the testator is survived by his spouse
and by issues of the marriage; the second part deals with situa-
tions in which the testator is survived by his spouse and by
issues of a former marriage.
I. DISPOSITION IN FAVOR OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE ANI)
THE LEGITIME OF ISSUES OF THE MARRIAGE
When the forced heirs of a testator are issues of his last
marriage, the validity and effect of dispositions in favor of the
surviving spouse may vary with the nature of the property of
the deceased. If the deceased's estate consists of separate prop-
erty only, the maximum that the survivor may receive by will
is the disposable portion in perfect ownership. If, however, the
deceased's estate consists of his share in the community only,
or of both separate and community property, the surviving
spouse may receive additional benefits.
1. Separate Property
In the presence of forced heirs, descendants or ascendants, a
testator whose estate consists of separate property only may give
to the surviving spouse as well as to a stranger the disposable
portion.8 Bequests in perfect ownership do not involve major
difficulties. If the bequest in favor of the surviving spouse does
not exceed the disposable portion, it will be given effect. If the
bequest exceeds the disposable portion, it will be reduced to
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1939-1940 Term--Trusts, 3
LA. L. REV. 267, 288 (1941); Nabors, The Shortcomings of the Louisiana Trust
Rstates Act and Some Problems of Drafting Trust Instruments Thereunder,
13 TUL. L. REv. 178, 294-05 (1939).
8. The disposable portion is determined by articles 1493 and 1494 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. Article 1493 provides that donations inter vivos
or mortis causa may not exceed two-thirds of the donor's property if there
is one child, one-half if there are two children, and one-third if there are
three or more children. Article 1494 provides that if the donor, having no
children, leaves a father, a mother, or both, donations may not exceed two-
thirds of the donor's property.
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that portion.9 Bequests in usufruct, however, may give rise to
difficulties, and, especially, to the question of the proper inter-
pretation of article 1499.10
i. Validity of Bequests in Usufruct or in Naked Ownership
Under the scheme of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, the
disposable portion is a quantum of the deceased's patrimony, i.e.,
is a money value. Correspondingly, the forced portion or legitime
is a money value which devolves to the heirs by operation of
law." The value of the legitime may not be diminished by
"a charge or condition"'12 imposed by the testator; for example,
the value of the legitime may not be burdened with a usufruct
in favor of a third person, be he a spouse or a stranger. This,
however, does not mean that the quantum of the legitime may
not be satisfied by bequests of naked ownership in sufficient
value or that a testator may not bequeath to a third person the
value of the disposable portion in usufruct. Since the legitime
represents a money value, and the usufruct as well as naked
ownership are measured in terms of money values, 13 the legitime
ought to be satisfied by patrimonial assets, devolving in perfect
ownership, naked ownership, or usufruct. 4 Of course, if the
9. See LA. CnvL CODE art. 1502 (1870): "Any disposal of property, whether
inter vivos or mortis causa, exceeding the quantum of which a person may
legally dispose to the prejudice of the forced heirs, is not null, but only re-
ducible to that quantum." By way of exception to this rule, donations be-
tween spouses in excess of the disposable quantum are null if "disguised,
or made to persons interposed." Id. art. 1754.
10. See Id. art. 1499: "If the disposition made by donation inter vivos or
mortis causa, be of a usufruct, or of an annuity, the value of which exceeds
the disposable portion, the forced heirs have the option, either to execute
the disposition or to abandon to the donee the ownership of such portion of
the estate as the donor had a right to dispose of." Cf. La Civil Code art. 1486
(1825); La. Civil Code p. 214, art. 23 (1808); FRENCH CIviL CODE art. 917.
11. See LA. Cva CODE arts. 1493, 1494, 1501, 1502 (1870); Comment, 37
TuL. L. REv. 710, 724, 739-52 (1963); Note, 13 LOYOLA L. J. 193, 197 (1967).
12. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 1710 (1870).
13. For the valuation of the usufruct and of the naked ownership, see
Yiannopoulos, Usufruct;' General Principles: Louisiana and Comparative
Law, 27 I.A. L. REv. 369, 412-18 (1967).
14. See Pascal, Some ABC's about Trusts and Us, 13 LA. L. REV. 555, 566
(1953): "Nothing in the legislation suggests that the legitime must be of
certain kinds of interest in property; the language of the legislation indicates
that a certain value fraction of the succession of a deceased person must go
to his forced heirs, but nothing is said about whether that legitime must be
in full ownership, usufruct or otherwise." For detailed discussion, and argu-
ments based on functional considerations, see Note, 13 LOYOLA L. J. 193 (1967).
Section 1845 of the Louisiana Trust Estates Code provides that "an un-
conditional income interest in trust, without an interest in principal, payable
not less than annually for a term or for the life of a beneficiary satisfies
the legitime to the same extent as would a usufruct of the same property
for the same term." LA. R.S. 9:1845 (1965). It is obviously assumed that a
bequest of usufruct may satisfy the legitime under the Civil Code. The pro-
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value of a disposition in usufruct "exceeds the disposable por-
tion, the forced heirs have the option, either to execute the dis-
position or to abandon to the donee the ownership of such portion
of the estate as the donor had a right to dispose of."15
This relatively simple, coherent, and internally consistent
scheme of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 has been consider-
ably blurred by jurisprudence. Faced with bequests of usufruct
in favor of forced heirs, Louisiana courts have, perhaps for
good reasons under the particular circumstances, allowed the
heirs to recover their legitime in unencumbered ownership.16
In a recent decision, a court of appeal went a step further and
declared that the legitime may not be satisfied by the devolu-
tion of property in usufruct, regardless of the value of the
usufruct.17 And, as a logical corollary of this last proposition,
visions of the Trust Estates Code "dealing with the legitime in trust, seek
to clarify rather than change the law." Oppenheim, A New Trust Code for
Louisiana-Act 338 of 1964, 39 TuL. L. REV. 187, 204 (1965).
15. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1499 (1870); Clarkson v. Clarkson, 13 La. Ann. 422
(1858). See also Comment, 37 TUL. L. REV. 710, 738-52 (1963); Note, 13 LOYOLA
L. J. 193 (1967). Article 1499 is not directly applicable to situations in which
a testator leaves to his forced heirs the usufruct of his entire estate or the
value of the legitime in usufruct. Nevertheless, this article might apply by
analogy. See Note, 41 TUL. L. REV. 210, 216 (1967). Application of article
1499 by analogy would involve abandonment by forced heirs of a bequest
of usufruct in their favor and claim of the legitime in unencumbered owner-
ship. See Note, 41 TUL. L. REV. 210, 214 (1967). French courts have refused
to apply article 1499 by analogy. See Cass., May 6, 1878, D. 1880.1.345, S.
1878.1.319; Cass., June 17, 1857, S. 1857.1.737. As a result, forced heirs in
France may demand their legitime in unencumbered ownership as well as
the testamentary disposition of the usufruct in their favor. The result has
been termed "illogical." 3 PLANioL, TRAITb PLgMENTAIRE DE DROIT civu 843 (9th
ed. 1924).
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1710 (1870). In Succession of Blossom, 194 La. 635,
194 So. 572 (1940), and in McCalop v. Stewart, 11 La. Ann. 106 (1856), courts
attributed to forced heirs, donees of the testator's estate in usufruct, their
legitime in unencumbered ownership and usufruct over the disposable por-
tion in accordance with the will. There was neither allegation nor proof
that the value of the usufruct was sufficient to satisfy the legitime. And in
Succession of Quinlan, 118 La. 602, 43 So. 249 (1907), a bequest of usufruct
in favor of the only forced heir of the testator apparently went unchal-
lenged.
17. See Succession of Williams, 184 So.2d 70, 73 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966):
"Article 1493 . . . means that the child is entitled to one-third of the
property of the disposer (not one-third of the value of such property) as a
forced portion of which he cannot be deprived, and we know of no law
which declares, or jurisprudence which holds, that the child's forced portion
or legitime may be defeated, satisfied or reduced by the bequest to him of
the usufruct of the estate, regardless of the value of the usufruct as com-
pared to the value of the legitime." The Williams case has been criticized
on several grounds. See Notes, 41 TUL. L. REV. 210 (1967); 13 LOYOLA L. J.
193 (1967); but see, Lazarus, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1965-66 Term-Donations and Testamentary Dispositions, 27 LA. L.
REV. 423, 449 (1967).
Under section 1845 of the Louisiana Trust Estates Code of 1964, "an
unconditional income interest in trust, without an interest in principal ...
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other courts have recently proclaimed that bequests of usufruct
to a spouse, which leave no opportunity for the satisfaction of
the legitime in unencumbered ownership, infringe on the legi-
time, unless, of course, the legitime is burdened with a legal
usufruct.'i
This jurisprudence is directly in conflict with article 1499
of the Civil Code, which confers an option on the forced heirs,
if the value of the usufruct exceeds the disposable portion, either
to execute the donation or to abandon to the donee of the
usufruct the disposable portion of the estate in perfect owner-
ship.19 Since forced heirs may demand reduction of the dona-
tion in all cases in which the donor fails to leave the legitime
in perfect ownership, the question of the value of the usufruct
becomes immaterial. This interpretation avoids the necessity
of an estimation of the value of the usufruct,20 and, in effect,
treats most bequests of usufruct as excessive at the option of
the heirs.2 1 Moreover, after reduction of a donation in usufruct
satisfies the legitime to the same extent as would a usufruct of the same
property for the same term." Since the provisions of the Trust Code dealing
with the legitime in trust seek to clarify rather than change the general law
(note 14 supra), the rights of forced heirs given an income interest in trust
might well be determined by analogous application of article 1499 of the
Civil Code. Applied to a trust disposition, article 1499 would confer on forced
heirs the option, either to accept the income interest, or to claim income as
well as principal interests on the part of the estate embracing the legitime;
as a result, the original principal beneficiaries would be entitled to both the
income and principal interests on the disposable portion of the estate. If,
on the other hand, the rule of the Williams case were to be followed, forced
heirs and income beneficiaries would be entitled to claim the income and
principal interests on the portion of the estate embracing the legitime as
well as the income interest on the disposable portion. For detailed discus-
sion, see Oppenheim, The Legitime in Trust, 42 TUL. L. REv. 239 (1968);
Comment, 37 TUL. L. REV. 710, 742-52 (1963); Note, 41 TUL. L. REv. 210, 216-17
(1967).
18. See Succession of Young, 205 So.2d 791 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968), dis-
cussed in text at note 75 infra; Succession of Ramp, 205 So.2d 86 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1968), discussed in text at note 81 infra. These decisions, dealing spe-
cifically with article 1752 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, as amended,
should be restricted to their own facts. Thus, argument may be made that,
if a bequest of usufruct is in favor of a stranger, the validity of the bequest
ought to be determined by application of article 1499 of the Code.
19. See notes 10, 15 supra.
20. See Succession of Brasswell, 142 La. 948, 77 So. 886 (1918), quoted in
note 66 infra. In France, difficulties connected with the valuation of usu-
fructs and of naked ownerships have given rise to "most abstruse and un-
workable theories." Comment, 37 TUL. L. REv. 710, 739 (1963). In Louisiana,
however, the valuation of usufructs and of naked ownerships is a relatively
simple matter. See Greco, Valuation of Naked Ownerships, Usufructs, and
Annuities under Louisiana Inheritance Tax Laws, 10 LA. BAR J. 119 (1962);
Cf. MCMAHON & RUBIN, Pleadings and Judicial Forms Annotated, in LA. STAT.
ANN. COD: Cv. p. 11, Form No. 807 (West 1964).
21. In effect, Louisiana courts have written out of article 1499 the clause
"the value of which exceeds the disposable portion." It ought to be noted,
however, that this interpretation carries the weight of French doctrine and
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considered by the courts to be excessive, forced heirs are seldom
held to be bound to the option granted them by article 1499.22
On the contrary, heirs ordinarily receive their legitime in per-
fect ownership as well as the naked ownership of the disposable
portion.23
ii. Dispensation of Security
If the bequest to the surviving spouse is one in usufruct,
the testator may dispense with the usufructuary's obligation to
furnish security.24 There should be no doubt that the dispensa-
tion of security is valid whether the usufruct is granted over
the disposable portion only or over the entire estate. If the
usufruct is granted over the disposable portion, the testator
should have the right to dispense with security because he is
free to dispose of this portion as he sees fit. If the usufruct is
granted over the entire estate, and the heirs elect to execute
the disposition, the dispensation of security ought to be valid
as a part of the disposition that the heirs choose to execute.25
If, on the other hand, the heirs decide to take their legitime in
perfect ownership and abandon to the donee the disposable
portion in perfect ownership, the question of security does not
arise.
jurisprudence interpreting the same provision in the light of its historical
derivation and intended meaning. See 11 ATUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANIAIS
50 (6th ed. 1956); 3 Planiol, TRAITP hLAMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 842 (9th ed. 1942);
3 MARCADA, EXPLICATION THA0RIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL 465 (7th ed., 1873).
22. Clarckson v. Clarckson, 13 La. Ann. 422 (1858), seems to be the only
reported case in which the provision of article 1499 [Article 1486 of the 1825
Code] was applied literally. See Note, 13 LOYOLA L. J. 193, 195 (1967).
23. See Succession of Young, 205 So.2d 791 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968), dis-
cussed in text at note 75 infra; Succession of Ramp, 205 So.2d 86 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1968), discussed in text at note 81 infra. Of course, it is another
question when the bequest of usufruct of an entire estate is made in favor
of the forced heirs rather than the surviving spouse or a stranger. In these
circumstances, article 1499 of the Civil Code does not apply directly. For an
excellent discussion of the question whether forced heirs should be entitled
to receive their legitime as well as testamentary dispositions in their favor,
see Note, 41 TuL. L. REV. 210 (1967). Of. Succession of Blossom, 194 La. 635,
194 So. 572 (1940); McCalop v. Stewart, 11 La. Ann. 106 (1856) (bequests of
usufruct of an entire estate in favor of forced heirs; held, forced heirs are
entitled to their legitime in unencumbered ownership as well as usufruct of
the disposable portion).
24. See LA. Civu, CODE art. 559 (1870); Yiannopoulos, Obligations of the
Usufructuary in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 42 TUL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1967).
25. Cf. LA. CIVrI CODE art. 1499 (1870). For detailed discussion, see Yian-
nopoulos, Obligations of the Usufructuary in Louisiana and Comparative
Law, 42 TuL L. REV. 1, 13 (1967). For Louisiana decisions declaring that,
under the original version of article 1752 of the Civil Code, the dispensation
of security is invalid, see text at note 85 infra.
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2. Community Property
When the forced heirs of a testator are issues of his last
marriage, and the estate consists of community property, the
surviving spouse may receive the usufruct of the deceased's
share in the community or the disposable portion in perfect
ownership as well as usufruct of the remainder. Issues of the
marriage may thus receive in satisfaction of their legitime either
the naked ownership of the deceased's share in the community
or merely the naked ownership of the reserved portion. This
result is reached by application of article 916 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870, as interpreted by Louisiana courts.
Article 916 declares that "in all cases, when the predeceased
husband or wife shall have left issue of the marriage with the
survivor, and shall not have disposed by last will and testa-
ment, of his or her share in the community property, the sur-
vivor shall hold a [in] usufruct, during his or her natural life,
so much of the share of the deceased in such community prop-
erty as may be inherited by such issue. This usufruct shall cease,
however, whenever the survivor shall enter into a second mar-
riage.26 The surviving spouse is thus clearly entitled to this legal
usufruct when the deceased spouse died without making a will.
But when the spouse in community dies testate, the effect of
particular bequests on the survivor's legal usufruct is not always
certain.
Early Louisiana decisions may be taken to indicate that the
mere execution of a will by the decedent amounted to a "dis-
position" of his share in the community which defeated the
legal usufruct.28 Later, however, Louisiana courts came to the
26. LA. CivIL CODE art. 916 (1870); of. Yiannopoulos, Legal Usfructs 4in
Louisiana and Comparative Law, 14 LoYOLA L. J. 1, 3-18 (1968); Oppenheim,
The Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse, 18 TUL. L. REv. 181 (1943); Comment,
25 LA. L. REv. 873 (1965). If there are children of a previous marriage as
well as children of the last marriage, the usufruct of the surviving spouse
burdens only the part of the community inherited by the children of the last
marriage. Succession of Williams, 168 La. 2, 121 So. 171 (1929); Succession
of Emonot, 109 La. 359, 33 So. 368 (1902); Hall v. Toussaint, 52 La. Ann. 1763,
28 So. 304 (1900); Succession of Heckert, 160 So.2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964). Thus, the validity and effect of dispositions in favor of the surviving
spouse will be determined in part under article 1752 and in part under
articles 1493, 1499, and 916 of the Civil Code. Cf. Succession of Bollinger, 30
La. Ann. 193 (1878).
27. See Succession of Russell, 208 La. 213, 23 So.2d 50 (1945); Kelley v.
Kelley, 198 La. 338, 3 So.2d 641 (1941); Tugwell v. Tugwell, 32 La. Ann. 848
(1880).
28. See, e.g., Succession of Schiller, 33 La. Ann. 1 (1881) (will providing
for distribution of the estate among "legal heirs, according to the laws now
in force in Louisiana"; held, no usufruct); Forstall v. Forstall, 28 La. Ann.
1968]
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conclusion that the surviving spouse is deprived of his legal
usufruct only by an adverse testamentary disposition.2 9 The
question of what constitutes an adverse disposition is a matter
of will construction, controlled by the intention of the testator2.
The courts thus ought to scrutinize the language employed in
the will and the scheme of distribution in order to ascertain
the intention of the testator.
When the testator exhausts his estate by bequests to third
persons, or without exhausting his estate he manifests his inten-
tion that the survivor should not receive the usufruct, the dis-
position is adverse.3 1 Likewise, when the testator exhausts his
estate by dispositions to third persons as well as to the survivor
(but less than the amount of the legal usufruct) argument may
be made that the testator has manifested an intention to defeat
the legal usufruct by adverse disposition.32 But when the testator
merely confirms the operation of the laws of intestacy,3 3 when
he disposes of only part of his estate without manifesting an
intention that the usufruct be defeated as to the balance, 34 or
197 (1876) (gift to the survivor of deceased's share in the community prop-
erty; held, bequest reduced to the disposable portion without usufruct over
the remainder); Grayson v. Sanford, 12 La. Ann. 646 (1857) (gift to the sur-
vivor of the disposable portion; held, no usufruct over the remainder).
29. See, e.g., Succession of Baker, 129 La. 74, 55 So. 714 (1911); Succes-
sion of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888); Succession of Brown, 94 So.2d
317 (La. App. Or. Cir. 1957); Succession of Lynch, 145 So. 42 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1932). In Succession of Glancey, 112 La. 430, 36 So. 483 (1904), the de-
ceased bequeathed by will only movable property of small value to third
persons. It was held that the disposition as to the remainder was not ad-
verse to the usufruct of the surviving spouse.
30. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1712, 1713, 1715 (1870).
31. For detailed discussion of Louisiana jurisprudence, see Yiannopoulos,
Legal Usufructs in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 14 LOYOLA L. J. 1 (1968).
32. See Ludowig v. Weber, 35 La. Ann. 579 (1883) (deceased husband left
by will four-fifths of his community share to his four children and one-fifth
to the widow; the court concluded that the survivor's usufruct did not attach
to the portions inherited by the children). In cases of partial disposition
of the estate in favor of the survivor, however, question arises as to whether
the survivor may receive both under the will and under article 916. See text
at notes 47-51 infra.
33. See Succession of Maloney, 127 La. 913, 54 So. 146 (1911); Succession
of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888); Fricke v. Stafford, 159 So.2d
52, 53 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) (the testator declaring that his estate should
be distributed "subject only to the usufructuary claim of my wife should
she survive me as fixed by law in her favor").
34. Intestacy may be only partial. If, for example, the deceased spouse
disposed of only a portion of his share in the community, the usufruct of
the surviving spouse may attach to the undisposed of portion. In Succession
of Glancy, 108 La. 414, 422, 32 So. 356, 359 (1902), the court declared to the
point that "if by his will he has disposed of certain specific property, and
no more, in full ownership, that particular property would pass out of the
succession by the legatee, free from the usufruct, but the usufruct would
attach to the balance . . . The cutting off of the usufruct would be measured
exactly by what had been disposed of by the deceased spouse to the prejudice
of the usufruct, and inconsistent with it."
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when he gives to the survivor more than he would have taken
if decedent had died intestate, the disposition is not adverse.35
i. Confirmation of the Legal Usufruct
According to well-settled Louisiana jurisprudence, testa-
mentary dispositions which are not adverse to the interests of
the surviving spouse confirm the legal usufruct of article 916.36
Moreover, this confirmation of the legal usufruct may be made
by express disposition.37
Since the rules applicable to legal usufructs differ in certain
essentials from the rules applicable to testamentary usufructs,
question arises as to the nature of a legal usufruct that has
been confirmed by will. It might be argued that the confirma-
tion should not convert the legal usufruct into a testamentary
one. Louisiana courts, however, have declared that the con-
firmed usufruct becomes testamentary for certain purposes but
remains legal for other purposes. In connection with the issue
of termination of the usufruct, Louisiana courts have held that
the usufruct becomes testamentary and does not terminate upon
remarriage.3 8 For purposes of taxation, however, Louisiana courts
have reached the opposite conclusion and have declared that the
confirmation of the legal usufruct by will is not sufficient to
change its nature.3 9 Accordingly, the survivor is not liable for
the payment of inheritance taxes. 0 Further, the survivor's usu-
fruct, though confirmed by will, is "legal" rather than testa-
35. See Winsberg v. Winsberg, 233 La. 67, 56 So.2d 444 (1957); Succession
of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888).
36. See note 33 supra.
37. It was early recognized that the legal usufruct could be confirmed
by will. In Grayson v. Sanford, 12 La. Ann. 646, 647 (1857), the court stated:
"As the Act of 1844 only gives the right of usufruct in the portion of the
community coming to the deceased, when he has left no will, it is clear that
he can give, by his testament, the usufruct of said portion, which would
belong to the surviving widow, without any will, or can declare that in the
event of a particular contingency, his widow shall inherit the portion of the
property, which the law authorizes him to bequeath."
38. See Succession of Carbajal, 154 La. 1060, 98 So. 666 (1924); Smith v.
Nelson, 121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908). In the first case, the testator had
clearly confirmed a usufruct that would have been established under article
916. Accordingly, argument might be made that this usufruct ought to
terminate upon remarriage. In the second case, however, there would have
been no usufruct in the absence of the will since the children of the testator
were issues of a former marriage. This usufruct was clearly testamentary.
39. See Succession of Baker, 129 La. 74, 55 So. 714 (1911); Succession of
Brown, 94 So.2d 317 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957); Succession of Lynch, 145 So.
42 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932); of. Succession of Norton, 157 So.2d 909 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1963).
40. See Yiannopoulos, Usufruct: General Principles: Louisiana and
Comparative Law, 27 LA. L. Rsv. 413-18 (1967).
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mentary for the determination of the legitime4' and, presum-
ably, for the dispensation of security.2
It is submitted that the question of the nature of a usufruct
confirmed by will ought to be resolved in the light of the
intention of the testator. If the testator intended to give to the
survivor the same rights that the law would have accorded him
in the absence of a will, the survivor's usufruct is legal. If,
on the other hand, the intention of the testator was to alter the
scheme of intestate succession and to give to the survivor addi-
tional rights, the usufruct ought to be classified as testamentary.
When a usufruct is granted in circumstances under which article
916 is inapplicable, i.e., over separate property of the deceased
or over community property inherited by persons other than
issues of the marriage, there should be no doubt that such
usufruct is testamentary.43
As the law stands today, a simple confirmation of the legal
usufruct by will does not deprive the survivor of any of the
advantages of the legal usufruct; on the contrary, according to
the jurisprudence, it confers the additional advantage that this
usufruct may not terminate upon remarriage. Testators who
wish to reach this result, however, should be encouraged to spell
it out in order to preclude proceedings for the construction of the
will.
ii. Cumulation of Rights Under Article 916 and Under the Will
Testamentary dispositions not adverse to the interests of the
surviving spouse, or expressly in favor of that spouse, give rise
to the question of whether the survivor may receive both under
article 916 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 and under the
will.
41. Of. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 233 La. 67, 56 So.2d 444 (1957); Succession
of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1883); text at notes 49-51 infra.
42. See Winsberg v. Winsberg, 233 La. 67, 56 So.2d 444 (1957); Succession
of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888). The question of security was not
raised in these cases. These cases, however, are fouunded on the doctrine
that a testament granting to the surviving spouse a usufruct over assets of
the community inherited by issues of the marriage merely confirms the
legal usufruct of article 916. It ought to follow, therefore, that no security
is due: Parents having any kind of legal usufruct over property of their
children are relieved by law of the obligation to furnish security.
43. This usufruct does not terminate upon remarriage. Smith v. Nelson,
121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908). The usufructuary owes taxes. Succession of
Eismann, 170 So.2d 913 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). And the survivor, in the
absence of testamentary dispensation, must furnish security. See Succes-
sion of Carlisi, 217 La. 675, 47 So.2d 42 (1950); Maguire v. Maguire, 110 La.
279, 34 So. 443 (1903); Succession of Cardona, 14 La. Ann. 356 (1859).
[Vol. XXVI
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS
When the testator gives to the survivor the disposable
portion, without mentioning usufruct, the question ought to be
resolved in the light of the intention of the testator, gathered
from the language in the will and the scheme of distribution.
In the absence of other indication, such a disposition should
not be regarded as adverse, designed to defeat the legal usufruct
under article 916. Indeed, it may be said that the testator
disposed of only part of his estate and that the partially undis-
posed of portion should devolve according to the rules of intes-
tate succession. 44 In Grayson v. Sanford,45 the will read: "I give
and bequeath to my wife . . . the use of my property, both
personal and real, during her life. However, if any of my
children should sue for partition during her life, I then will
and bequeath to her all of the property that I can dispose
of by law, forever." Upon suit by the children for partition, the
court held that the widow should be limited to the disposable
portion, without usufruct over the remainder. The case was
subsequently distinguished" and must be regarded as overruled
by recent jurisprudence.4 7 Thus, today, the survivor should be
entitled to both the disposable portion in perfect ownership and
the usufruct of the remainder of the community under article
916, unless the court could gather from the will that the inten-
tion of the testator was to defeat the usufruct. It follows, there-
fore, that the testator may by express provision give to the
surviving spouse the disposable portion in perfect ownership
and usufruct over the remainder.
When the intention of the testator to give both the disposable
portion in perfect ownership and the usufruct of the remainder
is established, it might be argued that the disposition violates
the legitime of forced heirs. It has been early established, how-
ever, that in such a case the testament merely confirms the
operation of article 916 and makes provision as to the property
44. See Succession of Glancy, 108 La. 414, 422, 32 So. 356, 359 (1902): "If
the deceased left the survivor the full ownership of certain property, he or
she would take that, holding the balance of his share in usufruct. If he
left a legacy to a third person, payable out of the revenues of either the
whole of his share in the community property, or of a particular or specific
part of it, the survivor would take the usufruct, but with the charge upon
it making payments of the legacy out of the revenues to the extent; the
legatee having the right to make his legacy available by and through the
usual remedies."
45. 12 La. Ann. 646 (1857).
46. Succession of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888).
47. See Winsberg v. Winsberg, 233 La. 67, 56 So.2d 444 (1957), note 51
4nfra.
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that is freely disposable in perfect ownership. In Succession of
Moore,48 the deceased had left to the widow the disposable por-
tion in perfect ownership and usufruct of the remainder. Over
arguments by heirs that their legitime had been infringed
upon, the court concluded that since an encumbrance placed
by law on the legitime could not violate article 1710, neither
could a mere confirmation of such encumbrance. 49
When the testator leaves his entire estate to the survivor
in perfect ownership, the disposition violates the legitime of
forced heirs and is reduced to the disposable portion. ° But,
according to Louisiana jurisprudence, article 916 continues to
operate and the survivor receives, in addition to the disposable
portion, the usufruct over the portion inherited by children of
the marriage. In Winsberg v. Winsberg,51 a legacy of the dece-
dent's entire estate to the surviving spouse was reduced to the
disposable portion. But, after reduction of the universal legacy
to the spouse, the usufruct under article 916 attached to the
forced portion. The prohibition of article 1710, the court rea-
soned, was not violated when the usufruct was given by opera-
tion of law and confirmed by will.
In the light of the foregoing, the legal situation in Louisiana
today may be summarized as follows. In the presence of issues
48. 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888).
49. See also Succession of Baker, 129 La. 74, 55 So. 714 (1911), involving
questions of liability for inheritance taxes. The testator had given to his
wife the disposable portion of his estate in perfect ownership and usufruct
of the remainder. The court imposed tax on the disposable portion which
came to the widow by way of inheritance and declared that no taxes were
due on her usufruct over one-third of the deceased's share of the commun-
ity, the part inherited by the sole forced heir. The court assumed, without
discussion, that the widow received both the disposable portion in perfect
ownership and usufruct of the remainder. Cf. Succession of Brown, 94 So.2d
317 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957).
50. See Winsberg v. Winsberg, 233 La. 67, 56 So.2d 444 (1957); Succession
of Heckert, 160 So.2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). For the determination of
the disposable portion, excessive inter vivos donations to the survivor are
fictitiously returned to the mass from which they came, i.e., the separate
property of the deceased or the mass of the community. The survivor,
however, not being an heir, is not required to collate if the donations exceed
the disposable portion. See Succession of Moore, 42 La. Ann. 332, 7 So. 561
(1890).
51. 233 La. 67, 96 So.2d 44 (1957), noted in 18 LA. L. REV. 574 (1958); 32
TUL. L. REv. 328 (1958). In Forstall v. Forstall, 28 La. Ann. 197 (1897), a do-
nation by the testator of all his property to the surviving spouse was re-
duced to the disposable portion. The court reasoned, further, that any dis-
position by the testator of his interest in the community nullified the opera-
tion of article 916, so that the spouse was entitled either to the disposable
portion or to the usufruct of the forced portion, since the former was all
that the testator could legally donate. The Forstall case was expressly
overruled in Winsberg v. Winsberg, supra.
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of the marriage, the maximum that a testator may give to the
surviving spouse out of his share in the community is either
usufruct over that share or perfect ownership of the disposable
portion plus usufruct over the remainder. The granting of a
usufruct over the deceased's share in the community inherited
by issues of the marriage confirms the operation of article 916;
this disposition gives rise to a usufruct governed in part by the
rules applicable to legal usufructs and in part by the rules
applicable to testamentary usufructs. The granting of the dis-
posable portion in perfect ownership plus usufruct over the
remainder involves, according to the jurisprudence, disposition of
freely disposable property and, in part, confirmation of the
legal usufruct of article 916. If the testator attempts to give to
the survivor in perfect ownership more than the laws of forced
heirship allow, the excessive donation will be reduced to the
disposable portion which will devolve to the surviving spouse
in perfect ownership. In addition, however, the surviving
spouse will receive the usufruct over the forced portion in-
herited by issues of the marriage. But if the testator makes
an excessive disposition in favor of a person other than the
surviving spouse, the survivor's legal usufruct is defeated to
the extent that this disposition exhausts the estate.5 2 As to undis-
posed of assets, the legal usufruct of the survivor may or may not
attach, depending on the intent of the testator.
3. Separate and Community Property
Whether his estate is composed of separate property, com-
munity property, or of both, a testator may, in the presence of
issues of the marriage, give to the surviving spouse the dis-
posable portion in perfect ownership.53 In addition, the testator
may confirm by will the legal usufruct of the surviving spouse
over one-half of the community property inherited by issues
of the marriage.5 4 But the testator may not burden with a usu-
fruct the legitime of forced heirs over his separate property.55
An excessive disposition in favor of the surviving spouse
52. If the disposition of the entire estate is made in favor of a person
other than the survivor, and this disposition is reduced to the disposable
portion, it is clear that the usufruct does not attach to the property be-
queathed to that person. And it ought to be equally clear that the usufruct
does not attach to the forced share inherited by children of the marriage
after reduction of the excessive donation. The intention of the testator to
make an adverse disposition is clear.
53. See text at notes 8, 48 supra.
54. See text at notes 33, 37 supra.
55. See text at notes 72, 15 supra.
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will be reduced to the disposable portion. If the disposition is
in perfect ownership, reduction will be made according to article
1493 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870; if the disposition is in
usufruct, reduction will be made, at the option of the heirs,
according to article 1499. In either case, after reduction, the
surviving spouse will be entitled to the disposable portion in
perfect ownership and to the legal usufruct under article 916.
The above principles may be regarded as settled, although
their application to certain factual situations has not been fully
tested in Louisiana. There should be no doubt that the quantum
of the disposable portion must be figured on the entire mass of
the succession, consisting of separate property, the deceased's
share in the community, and the value of inter vivos donations
subject to collation." But doubts may exist as to the method
by which the bequest to the surviving spouse will be satisfied.
Will it be satisfied out of community property, separate prop-
erty, or proportionately out of both? The method of satisfaction
of the bequest to the surviving spouse may be very important.
For example, if an estate is composed of separate property valued
at $50,000 and of the deceased's share in the community valued
at $50,000, and there are two children, the disposable portion
is $50,000. If the bequest to the surviving spouse were to be
satisfied out of community assets first, the legatee would receive
$50,000 in perfect ownership and the heirs $50,000 out of separate
property in perfect ownership. If the bequest were to be satisfied
out of separate property first, the surviving spouse would receive
$50,000 in perfect ownership and $50,000 in usufruct over the
deceased's share in the community.
In Succession of Moore,5 7 the court considered this problem
and issued guidelines. In this case, the deceased had left to his
widow the disposable portion in perfect ownership and usufruct
56. See LA. CIVIL CODr art. 1505 (1870); Succession of Moore, 40 La. Ann.
531, 4 So. 460 (1888); Comment, 37 TUL. L. REV. 710, 734 (1963).
57. 40 La. Ann. 531, 541, 4 So. 460, 465 (1888): "After payment of the
debts and charges against his estate . . . the net revenue must be divided
into three equal parts. The first third should be composed of the separate
property of Mr. Moore, and in addition of such portion of his share in the
community as may be necessary to complete that third. Out of this third
must be deducted the two legacies of $10,000, and the residue of the third
will accrue to Mrs. Moore in full satisfaction of the legacy of the disposable
portion made to her by her husband . . . Next, Mrs. Moore will be entitled
to the usufruct of the remaining share of the deceased in the community
during her widowhood, under the law, as confirmed by the will; and, finally,
the portion of the estate of the deceased as shall be thus subjected to the
usufruct of Mrs. Moore shall be deemed as the legitime, accruing in naked
ownership to the nine children, as forced heirs of the deceased."
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of the remainder of his estate. The estate was composed of the
deceased's share in the community (valued at $245,000) and of
separate property (valued at $7,000). The court found that, since
the testator was survived by more than three children, the dis-
posable portion was one-third of his estate. The bequest of the
disposable portion to the widow ought to be satisfied, according
to the court, out of separate property and of so much of the
deceased's share in the community as might be needed to make
up one-third of the mass of the succession. In addition, the widow
ought to receive the usufruct over the remainder of the deceased's
share in the community inherited by issues of the marriage.
The children were thus attributed the forced portion in naked
ownership.
It is submitted that this method of satisfaction of the bequest
of the disposable portion confers on the surviving spouse an
unfair advantage to the prejudice of the children. A much fairer
solution would be to satisfy the bequest of the disposable portion
proportionately out of separate property and community prop-
erty.58 Under the facts of the Moore case, the widow should
receive one-third of the separate property in perfect ownership
and likewise one-third of the community property in perfect
ownership. The children would then receive two-thirds of the
separate property of their deceased father in perfect ownership
and two-thirds of his share in the community in naked owner-
ship, in accordance with the letter and spirit of article 916, as
interpreted by Louisiana courts.
II. DISPOSITIONS IN FAVOR OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE AND THE
LEGITIME OF ISSUES OF A FORMER MARRIAGE
When the forced heirs of a spouse are issues of a former
marriage, the validity and effect of testamentary dispositions in
favor of the surviving spouse are matters governed by article
1752 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, in combination with
article 1493 of the same Code. There are no complications arising
out of article 916, and the nature of the deceased's property is
immaterial; but questions may arise as to the relevance of article
1499, if the disposition in favor of the surviving spouse is one
in usufruct.
Originally, article 1752 provided that a testator could not
58. In this respect, article 1511 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 should
apply by analogy. This article declares that "When the dispositions mortia




give to his spouse of a second marriage more than one-fifth of
his estate in usufruct if he was survived by children of a former
marriage. 59 This article was amended in 1882 to read that "a man
or a woman, who contracts a second marriage, having children
by a former one, can give to his wife, or she to her husband,
either by donation or by last will and testament, in full property,
or in usufruct, not exceeding one third of his or her property."'0
The article was again amended in 1916 to read that a spouse
having children of a former marriage may give to the surviving
spouse of the last marriage "in full property or in usufruct,
all of that portion of his estate, or her estate, as the case may
be, that he or she could legally give to a stranger.""' Thus, today,
article 1752 must be interpreted in the light of article 1493 which
fixes the disposable portion in general; and the quantum of
the disposable portion is the same whether the bequest is made
to the surviving spouse of a second marriage or to a stranger.
1. Validity of Bequests in Usufruct or in Naked Ownership
Application of article 1752 to bequests in perfect ownership
does not involve difficulties. If the disposition in favor of the
surviving spouse does not exceed the disposable portion, it will
be given effect. If the disposition exceeds the disposable portion,
it will be reduced to the quantum specified in article 1493. Be-
quests of usufruct, however, may give rise to difficult problems,
and, especially, to the question whether article 1752 should or
should not be interpreted in combination with article 1499. 62
In Succession of Brasswell,3 the testator gave to his second
wife the usufruct of his entire estate, and to his six children,
issues of a former marriage, the naked ownership. The children
brought action for the reduction of the bequest to their step-
mother to the usufruct of one-third of the estate, in conformity
with article 1752 of the Civil Code, as amended by act 14 of
1882.04 The widow claimed that the case was governed by article
1499 of the Civil Code and that the disposition in her favor
should be reduced, at the option of the heirs, to the disposable
59. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1752 (1870): "A man or a woman who contracts
a second or subsequent marriage, having children by a former one, can give to
his wife, or she to her husband, only the least child's portion, and that only
as a usufruct; in no case shall the portion, of which the donee is to have the
usufruct, exceed the fifth part of the donor's estate"; La. Civil Code art.
1745 (1825); La. Civil Code p. 258, art. 226 (1808); FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1098.
60. LA. CIvL CODE art. 1752 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1882, No. 13.
61. Id. art. 1752 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1916, No. 116.
62. See note 10 supra.
63. 142 La. 948, 77 So. 886 (1918).
64. See text at note 60 supra.
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portion in perfect ownership."5 In a well-considered opinion,
the court held that the disposition should be reduced to one-
third of the estate in usufruct. Article 1499 of the Civil Code,
the court reasoned, was indispensable for the practical applica-
tion of article 1493.68 But in contrast with article 1493 "which
fixes the disposable quota as between persons in general, article
1752, which fixes the disposable quota as between spouses, does
within itself, by its own text, furnish a rule, or the means, for
determining whether the disposable portion has been exceeded
in the case of a bequest of usufruct; hence an estimation such
as that which would have been necessary for the practical op-
eration of article 1493 . . . could not have been designed to
operate in connection with article 1752. In connection with article
1752, there was no necessity or reason for it."67
One may agree or disagree with the formal reasoning of
the court in the Brasswell case. On the basis of a literal inter-
pretation of article 1752, as it then stood, one might well reach
the conclusion that "one third may be given, and that this third
65. See Succession of Brasswell, 142 La. 948, 951, 77 So. 886, 888 (1918):
"The learned counsel for the widow would interpret this article 1752 as
reading that a usufruct may be given equal in value to one-third of the estate
in full ownership." The same argument was made, forty years later, in
Succession of Young, 205 So.2d 791 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968). See text at
note 77 infra.
66. See Succession of Brasswell, 142 La. 948, 950, 77 So. 886, 887 (1918):
"This article [1493], in fixing the disposable quota, speaks of full ownership
only, saying nothing of usufruct or annuity, so that it furnishes no rule or
means for determining whether the disposable quota has been exceeded or
not when the bequest consists not of the full ownership, but of the usufruct
only, or of an annuity; and therefore, if this article stood alone, the question
of excess vel non in the case of a donation of usufruct or annuity would
have to be determined by means of an estimation of the value of the usufruct
or annuity as compared with that of full ownership. Usufruct ends with the
life of the usufructuary; hence, in making such an estimation, the age,
constitution, the sex, the health, and incidentally the past life and habits,
of the usufructuary or annuitant, would have to be taken into consideration.
How unreliable, unsatisfactory, and disagreeably inquisitorial would be an
estimation based upon elements so personal and difficult of appreciation as
these it is easy to understand; and it is therefore easy to understand how
the advisability of providing some rule for avoiding the necessity of having
recourse to such an estimation would at once suggest itself. Out of that
necessity was born said article 1499, which provides such a rule." This line
of reasoning was certainly pertinent at the time the Brasswell case was de-
cided. Today, however, "in view of the statistical reliability of modern
actuarial tables, the French rejection of an attempt to calculate present
market value of the interest in question is perhaps a bit unrealistic." Com-
ment, 37 TUL. L. REV. 710, 741 (1963). Courts make frequent use of actuarial
tables in determining liability for taxes, and there is no reason why these
tables should not be used for ascertaining the value of a bequest In usufruct
or in naked ownership for the satisfaction of the legitime. Cf. Yiannopoulos,
Usufruct; General Principles in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 27 LA. L.
R v. 369, 416 (1967).
67. 142 La. 948, 950, 77 So. 886, 887 (1918).
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may be given in full ownership or in usufruct. It can be given
in no other form; not in the form of an annuity."68 Further, it
ought to be noted, that the opinion purported to carry the
weight of French doctrine and jurisprudence interpreting the
corresponding provision in the Napoleonic Code in the light of its
historical derivation and intended meaning.69 But grave doubts
may exist as to the validity of the Brasswell case as a prece-
dent after the amendment of article 1752 by act 116 of 1916.
In Succession of McLellan,7 0 decided under the present ver-
sion of article 1752, the testator had left to his wife of a second
marriage the disposable portion of his estate in perfect owner-
ship and usufruct over the remainder. The mass of the succession
consisted entirely of the deceased's share in the community but
article 916 of the Civil Code was inapplicable; hence, the testator's
children of a former marriage brought suit for the reduction of
the donation to the disposable portion. Under the authority of
the Brasswell case, the children claimed that "the decedent
could give in full property or in usufruct, but not both."', Coun-
sel for the widow argued, however, that "Article 1752 had been
amended since the decision of the Brasswell case and, therefore,
the case is not applicable. '7 2 The court rightly reduced the be-
quest in favor of the surviving spouse to the disposable portion
in perfect ownership and attributed to the children their legi-
time likewise in perfect ownership. The court grounded its deci-
sion on the authority of the Brasswell case, declaring that the
portion of article 1752 applicable to this case has not been
changed. Therefore, the widow was entitled "to the usufruct
68. Id. at 951, 77 So. at 888.
69. Id.: "[Tihe same question precisely arose in France which is pre-
sented in this case, namely, whether the children are limited to the option
provided for in article 1499 (917, C.N.) or may require the usufruct to be
reduced to the quota specified in the article fixing the disposable quota as
between spouses; and every word that is found in the decisions of the French
courts and in the books of the French commentators on the question is
applicable here." It ought to be noted, however, that the court followed,
erroneously, French doctrine and jurisprudence dealing with donations of
usufruct to a spouse in the presence of issues of the marriage. As to these
donations, governed by article 1094 of the Code Civil (corresponding to
article 1746 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870), article 917 was inapplicable.
But as to donations to a spouse of a second marriage, governed by article
1098 of the Code Civil (corresponding to article 1752 of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870), French courts have always applied article 917. See, e.g.,
Req., May 30, 1905, D.1908.1.166, S.1907.1.125, Req., July 1st, 1873, D.1874.1.26,
S.1874.1.17; Req., April 1, 1844, S.1844.1.844; 5 PLANIOL RT RIPERT, TRAIT2 PRA-
TIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANqAIS 199 (2d ed. Trabot et Loussouarn 1957).
70. 144 So.2d 291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).




of the property or to the disposable portion in [perfect] owner-
ship, but not both. '7 -
It is submitted that the case was rightly decided, but for
the wrong reasons. The Brasswell case was clearly distinguish-
able; it involved an excessive donation of usufruct rather than
a donation of the disposable portion in perfect ownership and
usufruct of the remainder. Moreover, the subsequent amend-
ment of article 1752 has, indeed, materially altered the entire
scope of this provision and the authority of the Brasswell case
is at best questionable today.74 But, be that as it may, the dis-
position in favor of the surviving spouse in Succession of
McLellan was excessive and should be reduced by direct applica-
tion of articles 1710 and 1499 of the Civil Code. Under the first
article, the legitime of forced heirs may not be burdened with a
usufruct and under the second article the heirs have the option
to abandon to the legatee of the usufruct the disposable portion
and claim their legitime in perfect ownership.
The question whether article 1752 of the Civil Code should
be interpreted in the light of article 1499 of the same Code
seemed to be a relevant issue in Succession of Young.75 In this
case, the testator left to his widow of a second marriage the
usufruct of his entire estate and to his daughter, issue of a
former marriage, the naked ownership. The daughter, citing
article 1752, claimed that the testator could "bequeath his second
spouse only the disposable portion of his estate, either in full
ownership or usufruct, and where the legitime of the forced
heir is impinged upon under such circumstances the bequest in
favor of the second spouse must be reduced. '76 As authorities
for these propositions, the claimant cited the Brasswell and the
McLellan cases. The widow, on the other hand, claimed that
under the authority of the McLellan decision "the surviving
spouse is entitled to either the usufruct of all the decedent's
property or the disposable portion in naked ownership, but not
both." Since, in this case, "only the usufruct of the decedent's
estate was bequeathed and since the value of the usufruct does
73. Id. The court declared that "the defendant herein is entitled to the
usufruct of the property or the disposable portion in naked ownership, but
not both." (Emphasis added.) The court obviously meant "perfect" rather
than "naked" ownership, and the apparent typographical error is corrected
in text.
74. See text at note 80 infra.
75. 205 So.2d 791 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
76. Id. at 795.
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not exceed the value of the disposable portion of decedent's
estate, the bequest is not subject to reduction."7
The court distinguished McLellan on the ground that the
testator in that case had left to the widow both the disposable
portion in perfect ownership and usufruct of the remainder, and
followed Brasswell because the factual situation in that case
was identical to the case at bar. Accordingly, the court reduced
the disposition in favor of the surviving spouse to the usufruct
of the disposable portion and attributed to the child its legitime
in perfect ownership as well as the naked ownership of the
disposable portion.78 The court thus rejected the widow's argu-
ment that the usufruct should be maintained on the entire estate
since the value of that usufruct did not exceed the value of
the disposable portion. In the first place, the court observed, the
value of the usufruct had not been disclosed by the record; but
even if that value had been disclosed, the court was of the
opinion that "in plain unambiguous language, Article 1752,
supra, states the testator may leave the surviving spouse, in
full ownership or in usufruct all that the testator could leave
to a stranger. It does not, as appellee contends, permit the bequest
of usufruct to the value of the disposable portion but rather
authorizes the giving of the disposable portion in usufruct." 79
One may agree with this literal interpretation of article 1752 of
the Civil Code. It does not expressly allow dispositions in usu-
fruct up to the value of the disposable portion. But neither com-
pels reduction of the donation to the disposable portion in
usufruct.
In its pre-1916 version, article 1752 contained a rule for the
determination of the disposable portion, in perfect ownership
or in usufruct, without reference to any other articles in the
Code. Today, however, article 1752 declares that the testator
may give to his spouse of a second marriage the same portion
of his property that he may give to a stranger. Hence, by neces-
77. Id.
78. Id. at 797: "of said amount [$12,888.141, the sum of $4,296.04 represents
the legitime of appellant Margaret M. Flair to which she is entitled in full
ownership free of the usufruct granted appellee Jessie G. Young. The re-
maining two-thirds of decedent's succession amounting to the sum of $8,-
592.10 constitutes the disposable portion of the estate and is inherited by
appellant in naked ownership subject to the usufruct thereon in favor of
appellee."
79. Id. at 795. The proposition is relevant in the context of a situation
governed by article 1752 of the Civil Code. It should not be extended to
situations in which a bequest of usufruct is made in favor of persons other
than the surviving spouse of a second marriage. See note 18 supra.
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sity, the rights of a forced heir of a former marriage must be
determined as if the excessive donation in favor of the surviving
spouse had been made to a stranger. If the disposition is in
perfect ownership, its validity and effect will have to be deter-
mined in the light of article 1493; and if the disposition is in
usufruct, its validity and effect will have to be determined in
the light of the option granted to forced heirs by article 1499.
It is true that article 1499, as interpreted in Louisiana and in
France, grants to forced heirs the option to demand reduction
of the donation in usufruct, without estimation of the value of
the usufruct.80 But, if the forced heirs exercise their option to
demand reduction of the donation, they must abandon to the
legatee of the usufruct, be he a surviving spouse of a second
marriage or a stranger, the disposable portion in perfect owner-
ship. The issues of a former marriage have no right to demand
reduction of the donation to the disposable portion in usufruct.
Application of article 1499, as suggested, would in most cases
produce results compatible with the intention of a testator who
wishes to bequeath to the surviving spouse of his last marriage
the maximum that the law allows. The bequest of the usufruct
of an entire estate may well be taken to establish that intention.
The original scheme of distribution devised by the testator may
not be carried out because the law accords to children their
option under article 1499. But, under this article, the surviving
spouse is accorded the same benefits that the testator himself
could have granted if he had foreseen that his children would
attack the will.
Nevertheless, Louisiana courts continue to reduce excessive
donations in favor of a surviving spouse of a second marriage
as if article 1499 did not exist. In Succession of Ramp,81 testator
was survived by his widow of a third marriage and by legiti-
mate descendants of the first and second marriages. He be-
queathed to his widow the usufruct of his entire estate, consist-
ing of both separate and community property, and to his children
their legitime in naked ownership. The children of the second
marriage attacked the will on the grounds that their father
lacked mental capacity to make a will and that he and his third
wife lived together without having been legally married. Sub-
sequently, however, these children entered into an agreement
with the widow by which they bound themselves to dismiss
80. See text at notes 16-18 supra.
81. 205 So.2d 86 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
1968]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
their action for the annulment of the will and to accept the
succession of their father in conformity with the will. Near the
end of the administration, however, the children employed new
counsel and claimed that that "the will impinged upon their
forced portion, contrary to Civil Code articles 1493 and 1499,
in view of the fact that their forced portion was burdened with
a usufruct in favor of the decedent's third wife. '8 2 The lower
court held that the child of the first marriage, who had not
signed the settlement, should receive its legitime in perfect
ownership; but the children of the second marriage were bound
by the terms of the agreement they had signed. From the judg-
ment against them, the children of the second marriage appealed.
On appeal, the children claimed that the agreement they
had signed and homologated was subject to rescission on the
ground of lesion beyond one-fourth of the true value of the
property. The court of appeal granted the children's request for
rescission. Following this determination, the court declared that
all children were entitled to their legitime unencumbered by
the usufruct of the surviving spouse. "The law is well settled,"
the court announced, "that . . . an heir is entitled to receive his
forced portion free of any usufruct whatsoever, with the excep-
tion of the usufruct of the surviving spouse provided for in
article 916 of the Civil Code. It is clear in this instance, however,
that article 916 is not applicable."' 3 As a result, the children
received their legitime in unencumbered ownership as well as
the naked ownership of the disposable portion-contrary to the
letter and spirit of article 1499 of the Civil Code.
In conclusion, one may observe that the Brasswell case
was correctly decided under the pre-1916 version of article 1752,
but the decision should no longer be considered as authority
for the proposition that a bequest of the usufruct of an entire
estate in favor of the surviving spouse of a second marriage
must be reduced to the usufruct of the disposable portion. The
McLellan case was correctly decided since the situation did not
call for direct application of article 1499. The Young and Ramp
cases should have been decided by reference to article 1499
which, at least in Ramp, had been brought to the attention of
the court; and the legatees of the usufruct should have been
given, at the option of the heirs, either the testamentary dis-
position or the disposable portion in perfect ownership. Under
82. Id. at 88.
83. Id. at 89.
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the actual state of the jurisprudence, testators who wish to
confer on the surviving spouse of a second marriage the maxi-
mum benefits permitted by the law should be advised to be-
queath the disposable portion in perfect ownership. An excessive
donation in usufruct may be reduced to the disposable portion
in usufruct, and, the surviving spouse of a second marriage may
receive less than the maximum allowed by the law or the maxi-
mum that the testator intended to bequeath. Reason and amend-
ments to article 1752 notwithstanding, Succession of Brasswell
is likely to rule us for times to come.
2. Dispensation of Security
According to the general law, a testator may dispense with
the obligation of the usufructuary to furnish security8 4 but
doubts have been expressed as to the validity of dispensation
when a bequest of usufruct is made to the surviving spouse
of a second marriage.
Under article 1745 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, and
original article 1752 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, a donor
could not give to his spouse of a second marriage more than
one-fifth of his estate in usufruct if he was survived by children
of a former marriage. In these circumstances, since the usufruct
burdened property inherited in naked ownership by forced heirs,
argument could be made that the dispensation of security was
invalid. In Depaz v. Riez,8 5 testator had left to his widow all that
the law permitted him to dispose of in her favor in perfect
ownership or in usufruct, at her choice, dispensing with security
in case she elected to take the usufruct. Since the testator had
been survived by a son by a former marriage, the court held
that the widow was entitled to the usufruct of one-fifth of the
testator's estate subject to her obligation to furnish security.
"Article 1845 of the Civil Code," the court declared, "forbids
testators to dispose of the legitimate portion to the prejudice
of their descendants, and art. 552, which authorizes them to
dispense the usufructuaries from giving security, must be con-
strued with reference to that prohibition. The power to place
the property, forming part of the legitimate portion, in the
possession of the usufructuary, without such security as will
ensure its return at the expiration of the usufruct, would enable
84. See LA. CIvIL CODE art. 559 (1870); Yiannopoulos, Obligations of the
Usufructuary in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 42 TUL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1967).
85. 2 La. Anti. 30 (1847).
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testators to evade a regulation of public order. Such a power
cannot exist."8 6
It is submitted that this solution is no longer valid after the
amendment of article 1752 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870
by the Acts of 1882 and 1916.87 Under the original version of
article 1752, a usufruct in favor of the surviving spouse of a
second marriage might be regarded as a burden on the legitime
of forced heirs, issues of a former marriage. Today, however, a
testator may give to his surviving spouse of a second mar-
riage, in full ownership or in usufruct, the same portion of his
estate that he may give to a stranger. Thus, a bequest of the
disposable portion in usufruct does not burden the children's
legitime; the children inherit the naked ownership of the dis-
posable portion by the effect of the will rather than by neces-
sity of law. And, since the testator is allowed to give to his
second wife the disposable portion in perfect ownership, he
should a fortiori be allowed to give it in usufruct without secu-
rity: "who can do more can do less."8 8 If the bequest of the usu-
fruct is excessive and is reduced at the option of the heirs under
article 1499, the question of security does not arise; and if an
excessive donation of usufruct is executed by the heirs, the
dispensation of security ought to be valid as a part of the
disposition that the heirs choose to execute.8 9
In the light of the foregoing, spouses of a second marriage
who wish to bequeath to the surviving spouse the disposable
portion of their estates in usufruct rather than in perfect owner-
ship may, if they so wish, dispense with security. In the absence
of dispensation, the courts will require security in accordance
with the general law 0
86. Id. at 43. In Succession of Bollinger, 30 La. Ann. 193 (1878), an
excessive donation to the surviving spouse was likewise reduced to the
disposable portion under original article 1752 of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870, i.e., to one fifth of the testator's estate in usufruct. After reduction,
the court imposed on the widow the duty to furnish security as to property
inherited in naked ownership by children of a former marriage. Since the
testator had not dispensed with security by will, the decision is correct
both under the old and the new version of article 1752.
87. See text at notes 60, 61 supra.
88. Succession of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 531, 537, 4 So. 460, 462 (1888).
89. See text at note 25 supra. If the heirs decide to take their legitime
in full ownership and abandon to the donee the disposable portion likewise
in naked ownership, forced portions may be subjected to usufruct only under
the terms of article 916 of the Civil Code; but this article is inapplicable to
forced heirs of a former marriage. See text at note 26 supra.
90. See Succession of Young, 205 So.2d 791 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
